

- *Knowledge base* = set of *sentences* in a *formal* language
- *Declarative* approach to building an agent (or other system)
 - TELL it *what* it needs to know
- Then it can ASK itself what to *do*—answers should follow from the KB

Introduction


- So far we have looked mainly at how agents can use techniques based on search to decide what they might do.
- This is one major area of artificial intelligence.
- Today we will start to look at another major area, the use of *knowledge* about the world, and *reasoning* that we might do with the knowledge.
- In particular we will look at the use of *logic* which has been widely used in AI and used for a long time.

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- Agents can be viewed at the *knowledge level*
 - what they know, regardless of how implemented
- Or at the *implementation level*
 - data structures in KB and algorithms that manipulate them


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
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



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- Observable/Accessible? No—only local perception
- Deterministic Yes—outcomes exactly specified
- Episodic No—sequential at the level of actions

Characterization of WW • Observable/Accessible? No—only local perception • Deterministic Yes—outcomes exactly specified • Episodic No—sequential at the level of actions • Static?

Characterization of WW

- Observable/Accessible? No-only local perception
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- *Episodic* No—sequential at the level of actions
- Static Yes—Wumpus and Pits do not move


Characterization of WW


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
- Observable/Accessible? No—only local perception
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- *Episodic* No—sequential at the level of actions
- *Static* Yes—Wumpus and Pits do not move
- Discrete?

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






Characterization of WW


- Observable/Accessible? No—only local perception
- Deterministic Yes—outcomes exactly specified
- Episodic No—sequential at the level of actions
- *Static* Yes—Wumpus and Pits do not move
- *Discrete* Yes
- *Single-agent* Yes—Wumpus is essentially a natural feature


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


Entailment

• *Entailment* means that one thing *follows from* another:

$\mathit{KB} \models \alpha$

- Knowledge base *KB* entails sentence *α if and only if α* is true in all worlds where *KB* is true.
- The KB containing "the Giants won" and "the Jets won" entails "The Giants won or the Jets won"
- x + y = 4 entails 4 = x + y
- Entailment is a relationship between sentences, *syntax*, that is based on *semantics*






• Logicians typically think in terms of *models*, which are formally structured worlds with respect to which truth can be evaluated


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
- We say *m* is a model of a sentence α if α is true in *m*
- $M(\alpha)$ is the set of all models of α
- Then $KB \models \alpha$ if and only if $M(KB) \subseteq M(\alpha)$


KB = Giants won and Jets won α = Jets won


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












- We will define a logic (first-order logic) which is expressive enough to say almost anything of interest, and for which there exists a sound and complete inference procedure.
- That is, the procedure will answer any question whose answer
- (This is a subset of first order logic, so we will reuse everything

Propositional Logic — Syntax

• Propositional logic is the simplest logic—illustrates basic ideas

- **Definition:** A *proposition* is a statement that can be either *true* or *false*; it must be one or the other, and it cannot be both.
- The following are propositions:
 - the reactor is on;
 - the wing-flaps are up;
 - Marvin K Mooney is president.

whereas the following are not:

- are you going out somewhere?

-2+3

- A good test for a proposition is to ask "Is it true that...?".
- If that makes sense, it is a proposition.

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- If *S* is a sentence, ¬*S* is a sentence *negation*
- If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \wedge S_2$ is a sentence *conjunction*
- If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \vee S_2$ is a sentence *disjunction*
- If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \Rightarrow S_2$ is a sentence *implication*
- If S_1 and S_2 are sentences, $S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$ is a sentence *biconditional*
- Given some *language* (set of propositions), we will write W to denote *all* the sentences that can be constructed using these rules.
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- Now, rather than write out propositions in full, we will abbreviate them by using *propositional variables*.
- It is standard practice to use the lower-case roman letters

 p, q, r, \ldots

to stand for propositions.

• Just to be confusing, we, like the textbook have been using the proposition symbols $B_{1,2}$ to stand for:

It is breezy in [1, 2].

- These propositions, which indicate a single thing in the real world, are called *atomic propositions*.
- These propositions are also a simple form of *sentence*.
- We can also construct more complex sentences in the form of *compound propositions*.

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
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Propositional logic — Semantics

- Each model specifies true/false for each proposition symbol
- Also called an *interpretation*
- Also called a *valuation*
- Here's a model/interpretation/valuation:

 $\begin{array}{ccc} P_{1,2} & P_{2,2} & P_{3,1} \\ true & true & false \end{array}$

• With these symbols, 8 possible models/interpretations/ valuations, can be enumerated automatically





- If we consider all possible models, there are different properties that may hold for a sentence.
- A sentence is *valid* if it is true in *all* models.

 $\textit{True,} \quad A \lor \neg A, \quad A \Rightarrow A, \quad (A \land (A \Rightarrow B)) \Rightarrow B$

• Validity is connected to inference via the *Deduction Theorem*:

 $\textit{KB} \models \alpha \text{ if and only if } (\textit{KB} \ \Rightarrow \ \alpha) \text{ is valid}$

• A sentence that is *valid* is said to be a *tautology*.

Truth tables for connectives

• These rules correspond to the truth tables for the connectives:

Р	Q	$\neg P$	$P \wedge Q$	$P \lor Q$	$P \Rightarrow Q$	$P \Leftrightarrow Q$
false	false	true	false	false	true	true
false	true	true	false	true	true	false
true	false	false	false	true	false	false
true	true	false	true	true	true	true

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• Each line in a truth table is a model.

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
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• A sentence is *satisfiable* if it is true in *some* model

 $A \lor B$ C

- It is satisfiable if it is possible to make it true by picking the right truth values for its atomic propositions.
- If a sentence is satisfiable we also say that it is *consistent*.



• If a sentence is unsatisfiable, then clearly it is not satisfiable (hence the name).

- It is clearly not consistent either, so we call it *inconsistent*.
- Satisfiability is connected to inference via:

KB $\models \alpha$ if and only if (*KB* $\land \neg \alpha$) is unsatisfiable

Thus we can prove α by *reductio ad absurdum*

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			Ir	uth t	able	es foi	r infe	eren	ce			
$B_{1,1}$	$B_{2,1}$	$P_{1,1}$	$P_{1,2}$	$P_{2,1}$	$P_{2,2}$	$P_{3,1}$	R_1	R_2	R_3	R_4	R_5	KB
false	false	false	false	false .	false	false	true	true	true	true	false	false
false	false	false	false	false .	false	true	true	true	false	true	false	false
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
false	true	false	false	false _.	false	false	true	true	false	true	true	false
false	true	false	false	false .	false	true	true	true	true	true	true	<u>true</u>
false	true	false	false	false	true	false	true	true	true	true	true	<u>true</u>
false	true	false	false	false	true	true	true	true	true	true	true	<u>true</u>
false	true	false	false	true .	false	false	true	false	false	true	true	false
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
true	true	true	true	true	true	true	false	true	true .	false	true	false
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	Í


Recall that KB ⊨ α if and only if M(KB) ⊆ M(α). We illustrated this graphically for the WW. Turns out we can determine if M(KB) ⊆ M(α) using truth tables. We write out every possible combination of truth values for the atomic propositions. Enumerate all the models. If KB is true in row, check that α is too. If this is the case, then M(KB) ⊆ M(α) and so KB ⊨ α

Truth tables for inference

Algorithm for this inference procedure

function TT-ENTAILS? (*KB*, α) **returns** *true* or *false* **inputs**: *KB*, the knowledge base, a sentence in propositional logic α , the query, a sentence in propositional logic *symbols* \leftarrow a list of the proposition symbols in *KB* and α **return** TT-CHECK-ALL(*KB*, α , *symbols*, [])

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- Here is another way to think about what we are doing here.
- Theorem:

$$\{S_1,\ldots,S_n\}\models 0$$

iff

$$\models (S_1 \wedge \dots \wedge S_n) \Rightarrow C$$

- So we have a method for determining whether *C* is a logical consequence of S_1, \ldots, S_n .
- We use a truth table to see whether $S_1 \land \cdots \land S_n \Rightarrow C$ is a tautology.
- If it is, then *C* is a logical consequence of S_1, \ldots, S_n .
- We call this the *truth table method*.
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- TT-CHECK-ALL is first called with an empty model and recursively expands it.
 - Tries to avoid enumerating all the models
- PL-TRUE? returns true if a sentence holds in the model.
- EXTEND(*P*, *true*, *model*)) extends a partial model (only gives values for some propositions) with one in which *P* is true.
- This algorithm is *sound* and *complete*
- For *n* symbols this is $O(2^n)$.
 - co-NP-complete
- So, that is not good, but it does give our logical agent a way to figure things out about the world.

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• For example, to show that $p \wedge q \models p \lor q$. To do this, we construct a truth-table for $(p \land q) \Rightarrow (p \lor q).$ Here it is: (1)(2) $p \land q \mid p \lor q \mid (1) \Rightarrow (2)$ р q false false false false true false true false true true true false false true true true true true true true Since $(p \land q) \Rightarrow (p \lor q).$ is true in every model, we have that $p \lor q$ is a logical consequence of $p \wedge q$. cisc3410-fall2010-parsons-lect05

Logical equivalence

- Two sentences are emphlogically equivalent iff they are true in same models.
- $\alpha \equiv \beta$ if and only if $\alpha \models \beta$ and $\beta \models \alpha$
- There are some common equivalences on the next slide.
- These are universal tautologies they will always be true in all possible models.
- These are handy because they are tautologies, and so we can bring them into proofs (when we get to that).

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Proof methods

• Proof methods divide into (roughly) two kinds.

Model checking

- truth table enumeration (always exponential in *n*
- improved backtracking, e.g.,
 Davis–Putnam–Logemann–Loveland
- heuristic search in model space (sound but incomplete)
- Application of inference rules
 - Legitimate (sound) generation of new sentences from old
 - Proof = a sequence of inference rule applications
 - Can use inference rules as operators in a standard search alg.
 - May require translation of sentences into a normal form

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 $\begin{array}{l} (\alpha \wedge \beta) \equiv (\beta \wedge \alpha) \quad \text{commutativity of } \wedge \\ (\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv (\beta \vee \alpha) \quad \text{commutativity of } \vee \\ ((\alpha \wedge \beta) \wedge \gamma) \equiv (\alpha \wedge (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \quad \text{associativity of } \wedge \\ ((\alpha \vee \beta) \vee \gamma) \equiv (\alpha \vee (\beta \vee \gamma)) \quad \text{associativity of } \vee \\ \neg (\neg \alpha) \equiv \alpha \quad \text{double-negation elimination} \\ (\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \equiv (\neg \beta \Rightarrow \neg \alpha) \quad \text{contraposition} \\ (\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \equiv (\neg \alpha \vee \beta) \quad \text{implication elimination} \\ (\alpha \Leftrightarrow \beta) \equiv ((\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \Rightarrow \alpha)) \quad \text{biconditional elimination} \\ \neg (\alpha \wedge \beta) \equiv (\neg \alpha \vee \neg \beta) \quad \text{De Morgan} \\ \neg (\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv ((\alpha \wedge \beta) \vee (\alpha \wedge \gamma)) \quad \text{distributivity of } \wedge \text{ over } \vee \\ (\alpha \vee (\beta \wedge \gamma)) \equiv ((\alpha \vee \beta) \wedge (\alpha \vee \gamma)) \quad \text{distributivity of } \vee \text{ over } \wedge \end{array}$

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
'Syntactic' Proof

- The idea of syntactic proof is to replace the checking of models to determine whether a formula is valid by a procedure that involves purely *syntactic* manipulation.
- The kinds of techniques that we shall use are similar to those that we use when solving problems in algebra.
- The basic idea is that to show that *C* is a logical consequence of S_1, \ldots, S_n , we use a set of *rules* to manipulate formulae.

If we can derive *C* from S_1, \ldots, S_n by using these rules, then *C* is said to be *proved* from S_1, \ldots, S_n , which we indicate by writing

 $S_1,\ldots,S_n\vdash C.$

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• Let us now try to define precisely what we mean by *proof*. • Definition: (Proof) If $\{S_1,\ldots,S_n,C\}\subseteq \mathcal{W}$ then there is a proof of *C* from S_1, \ldots, S_n iff there exists some • If there is a proof of *C* from S_1, \ldots, S_n , then we indicate this by sequence of formulae writing: T_1,\ldots,T_m $S_1,\ldots,S_n\vdash C$ such that $T_m = C$, and each formula T_k , for $1 \le k < m$ is either one of the formula S_1, \ldots, S_n , or else is the conclusion of a rule whose antecedents appeared earlier in the sequence. The sequence of formulae T_1, \ldots, T_m is the *proof*. cisc3410-fall2010-parsons-lect05 cisc3410-fall2010-parsons-lect05 69 • **Definition:** (Soundness) A proof system \vdash is said to be *sound* with respect to semantics \models iff • It should be clear that the symbols \vdash and \models are related. We now have to state exactly how they are related. $S_1,\ldots,S_n\vdash C$ • There are two properties of ⊢ to consider: implies $S_1,\ldots,S_n\models C.$ - soundness; - completeness. • **Definition:** (Completeness) A proof system \vdash is said to be • Intuitively, \vdash is said to be *sound* if it is correct, in that it does not *complete* with respect to semantics \models iff let us derive something that is not true. $S_1,\ldots,S_n\models C$ • Intuitively, *completeness* means that \vdash will let us prove anything that is true. implies $S_1,\ldots,S_n\vdash C$

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- There are many proof systems for propositional logic; we shall look at a simple one.
 - Natural deduction
- First, we have an unusual rule that allows us to introduce any tautology.

$$\frac{TAUT}{FS}$$
 if *S* is a tautology

- Because a tautology is true there is no problem bringing it into the proof.
- An example tautology is "Either the Mets won, or they lost".

Or-elimination

$$\begin{array}{c} \vdash S_1 \lor \cdots \lor S_n; \\ S_1 \vdash C; \\ \cdots; \\ S_n \vdash C \\ \hline \vdash C \end{array} \lor - C$$

• This is more complex.

I hear on the radio that "New York won today", so I know "The Jets won, or the Giants won, or both". Now I have bet on both teams to win, so "If the Jets won, I have won some money" and "If the Giants won, I won some money", so, overall "I won some money".



$$\frac{\vdash S_1 \land S_2}{\vdash S_1; \vdash S_2} \land -\mathsf{E}$$

• We already saw this one:

If we are told "The Jets won and the Giants won", then we know "The Jets won" and we know "The Giants won".

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• An alternative version of the \vee elimination rule is:

$$\begin{array}{c} \vdash S_1 \lor S_2; \\ \vdash S_1 \Rightarrow C; \\ \vdash S_2 \Rightarrow C \\ \hline \vdash C \end{array} \lor -E$$

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
• Next, a rule called *modus ponens*, which lets us eliminate \Rightarrow . • Next, rules for *introducing* connectives. $\frac{\vdash S_1 \Rightarrow S_2; \vdash S_1}{\vdash S_2} \Rightarrow -E$ $\frac{\vdash S_1; \cdots; \vdash S_n}{\vdash S_1 \land \cdots \land S_n} \land -\mathbf{I}$ • We use that here: • Example: If I know "If the Jets won, they qualified for the playoffs", "The Jets won" and "The Giants won", so "The Jets and the and I learn "The Jets won", the I can conclude "The Jets Giants won". qualified for the playoffs" 77 cisc3410-fall2010-parsons-lect05 cisc3410-fall2010-parsons-lect05 • We have a rule called the *deduction theorem*. This rule says that if we can prove S_2 from S_1 , then we can prove that $S_1 \Rightarrow S_2$. • Here is Or-introduction: $\frac{S_1 \vdash S_2}{S_1 \Rightarrow S_2} \Rightarrow -\mathbf{I}$ $\frac{\vdash S_1}{\vdash S_1 \lor \cdots \lor S_n} \lor^{-\mathbf{I}}$ • So, what is an example? • Example: If somebody tells me "The Jets won", and then I realise "The Jets won" so "The Jets or the Giants won". after thinking about my bets, that "I have won some money", then I can conclude that "If the Jets win, I will win some money".

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
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
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- I'll post a handout with them on the course web-page.
- Rather than go through them, let's look at what a proof is.





• Recall that a proof is defined as:

 $S_1,\ldots,S_n\vdash C$

iff there exists some sequence of formulae


 S_1,\ldots,S_m


such that $S_m = C$, and each formula S_k , for $1 \le k < m$ is either one of the formula S_1, \ldots, S_n , or else is the conclusion of a rule whose antecedents appeared earlier in the sequence.


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• The sequence of formulae S_1, \ldots, S_m is the *proof*.

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• Example 6: $p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r) \vdash (p \land q) \Rightarrow r$ 1. $p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)$ Given 2. $p \land q$ As. | 3. p 2, \land -E | 4. q 2, \land -E | 5. $q \Rightarrow r$ 1, 3, \Rightarrow -E | 6. r 4, 5, \Rightarrow -E | 7. $(p \land q) \Rightarrow r$ 2-6, \Rightarrow -I


• The rule allows us to negate an assumption it it leads us to a contradiction.

$$\frac{S\vdash\bot}{\vdash\neg S}\neg\text{-I}$$

• \perp stands for any formula which is unsatisifable, for example

 $S \wedge \neg S$

- We call such a formula a *contradiction* and say that it is *inconsistent*.
- The notion behind the rule is that if we assume something, and that leads us to an impossible conclusion, what we assumed has to be wrong.



• Can we prove that it is not possible for Jim to party and pass AI
$(\neg (p \land q))?$

1. $r \Rightarrow \neg p$	Given
2. $\neg r \Rightarrow \neg q$	Given
3. $p \wedge q$	As.
4. r	As.
5. ¬p	1, 4, ⇒-E
6. <i>p</i>	3, ∧-I
7. $p \wedge \neg p$	5, 6, ∧-I
8. $\neg r$	4,7, ¬-I
9. $\neg q$	2, 9, ⇒-E
10. q	3, ∧-E
11. $q \wedge \neg q$	9, 10, ∧-I
12. $\neg (p \land q)$	3, 11, ¬-I

• Example 9:

Can Jim will party all night and pass AI? That must be wrong. If he works hard he won't have time to party. If he doesn't work hard he's not going to pass AI.

Let:

p Jim will party all night*q* Jim will pass AI*r* Jim works hard

Formalisation of argument:

$$r \Rightarrow \neg p, \neg r \Rightarrow \neg q \vdash \neg (p \land q)$$

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Summary

- This lecture covered an introduction to using logic to program agents.
- We started with some motivation having an agent figure out some facts in the Wumpus world.
- We showed informally how this might be done using models.
- We then introdcued propositional logic, a formal system for reasoning, and showed how we can automate the model checking process.
- Finally we looked at approaches to proof based on symbol manipulation.

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