

RESOLUTION AND FIRST ORDER LOGIC

Introduction

- In the last class we talked about logic.
- In particular we talked about why logic would be useful.
- We covered propositional logic — the simplest kind of logic.
- We talked about proof using the rules of natural deduction.
- This week we will look at some other aspects of proof.
- We will also look at a more expressive kind of logic.

Logic and proof

- Need to be clear that logics exist separate from any proof method that they use.
- Can have one logic with many proof methods.
- Those same methods may work for many logics.
- So far we have looked at one logic (propositional logic) and one proof system (natural deduction).
- We will look at:
 - More proof systems for propositional logic
 - Another logic.

- New proof systems:
 - Forward chaining
 - Backward chaining
 - Resolution
- New logic
 - Predicate logic

New proof systems

- One of the good things about natural deduction is that it is easy to understand.
 - Proofs are often intuitive
- However, there is lots to decide:
 - Which sentence to use
 - Which rule to apply
- Can be hard to program a system to use it.
- Q: How to make it easier?

Horn clauses

- A: Restrict the language
 - *Horn clauses*
- A Horn clause is:
 - An atomic proposition; or
 - A conjunction of atomic propositions \Rightarrow atomic proposition

- For example:

$$C \wedge D \Rightarrow B$$

- KB = *conjunction* of *Horn clauses*

- For example:

$$C \wedge (B \Rightarrow A) \wedge (C \wedge D \Rightarrow B)$$

- Modus ponens is then:

$$\frac{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n, \quad \alpha_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \alpha_n \Rightarrow \beta}{\beta}$$

- Sometimes called “generalized modus ponens”.
- For Horn clauses, modus ponens is all you need
 - Complete
- Can be used with *forward chaining* or *backward chaining*.
- These algorithms are very natural and run in *linear* time

Forward chaining

- Idea: “fire” any rule whose premises are satisfied in the *KB*, add its conclusion to the *KB*, until query is found

$$P \Rightarrow Q$$

$$L \wedge M \Rightarrow P$$


$$B \wedge L \Rightarrow M$$

$$A \wedge P \Rightarrow L$$


$$A \wedge B \Rightarrow L$$


A


B





- How does this work?





















```

function PL-FC-ENTAILS?(KB, q) returns true or false
inputs: KB, the knowledge base, q the query
local variables: count, a table, indexed by clause,
                    initially the number of premises
                    inferred, table of symbols, initially all false
                    agenda, list of symbols, initially whole KB

while agenda is not empty do
  p ← POP(agenda)
  unless inferred[p] do
    inferred[p] ← true
    for each Horn clause c in whose premise p appears do
      decrement count[c]
      if count[c] = 0 then do
        if HEAD[c] = q then return true
        PUSH(HEAD[c], agenda)

return false

```


Proof of completeness


- FC derives every atomic sentence that is entailed by KB
 1. FC reaches a *fixed point* where no new atomic sentences are derived
 2. Consider the final state as a model m , assigning true/false to symbols
 3. Every clause in the original KB is true in m


Proof: Suppose a clause $a_1 \wedge \dots \wedge a_k \Rightarrow b$ is false in m
Then $a_1 \wedge \dots \wedge a_k$ is true in m and b is false in m
Therefore the algorithm has not reached a fixed point!
 4. Hence m is a model of KB
 5. If $KB \models q$, q is true in *every* model of KB , including m
- *General idea:* construct any model of KB by sound inference, check α


Backward chaining


- Idea: work backwards from the query q
 - to prove q by BC,
 - check if q is known already, or
 - prove by BC all premises of some rule concluding q
- Avoid loops: check if new subgoal is already on the goal stack
- Avoid repeated work: check if new subgoal
 1. has already been proved true, or
 2. has already failed




















Forward v. backward chaining

- FC is *data-driven*, cf. automatic, unconscious processing
 - e.g., object recognition, routine decisions
- May do lots of work that is irrelevant to the goal
- BC is *goal-driven*, appropriate for problem-solving,
 - e.g., Where are my keys? How do I get into a PhD program?
- Complexity of BC can be *much less* than linear in size of KB

Resolution


- Resolution is another proof system.
 - Sound and complete for propositional logic.
- Just one inference rule:

$$\frac{l_1 \vee \dots \vee l_k, \quad m_1 \vee \dots \vee m_n}{l_1 \vee \dots \vee l_{i-1} \vee l_{i+1} \vee \dots \vee l_k \vee m_1 \vee \dots \vee m_{j-1} \vee m_{j+1} \vee \dots \vee m_n}$$

where l_i and m_j are complementary literals.

- Eh?

- As an example, here:



- We might resolve:

$$\frac{P_{1,3} \vee P_{2,2}, \quad \neg P_{2,2}}{P_{1,3}}$$

- So, if we know $P_{1,3} \vee P_{2,2}$ and $\neg P_{2,2}$ then we can conclude $P_{1,3}$

- Only issue — resolution only works for KB in *conjunctive normal form*
- *conjunction* of *disjunctions* of *literals*
clauses
- Such as:
$$(A \vee \neg B) \wedge (B \vee \neg C \vee \neg D)$$
- Have to convert sentences to CNF.

- Example: $B_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})$

1. Eliminate \Leftrightarrow , replacing $\alpha \Leftrightarrow \beta$ with $(\alpha \Rightarrow \beta) \wedge (\beta \Rightarrow \alpha)$.

$$(B_{1,1} \Rightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})) \wedge ((P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \Rightarrow B_{1,1})$$

2. Eliminate \Rightarrow , replacing $\alpha \Rightarrow \beta$ with $\neg\alpha \vee \beta$.

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge (\neg(P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \vee B_{1,1})$$

3. Move \neg inwards using de Morgan's rules and double-negation:

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge ((\neg P_{1,2} \wedge \neg P_{2,1}) \vee B_{1,1})$$

4. Apply distributivity law (\vee over \wedge):

$$(\neg B_{1,1} \vee P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1}) \wedge (\neg P_{1,2} \vee B_{1,1}) \wedge (\neg P_{2,1} \vee B_{1,1})$$

Resolution example

- $KB = (B_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,2} \vee P_{2,1})) \wedge \neg B_{1,1}$

$$\alpha = \neg P_{1,2}$$

- First we have to convert the KB into conjunctive normal form.
- That is what we just did (here's one I made earlier):

$$\neg P_{2,1} \vee B_{1,1}$$

$$\neg B_{1,1} \vee B_{P_{1,2}} \vee P_{2,1}$$

$$\neg P_{1,2} \vee B_{1,1}$$

$$\neg B_{1,1}$$

- To this we add the negation of the thing we want to prove.

$$P_{1,2}$$

- Resolution works by repeatedly combining these formulae together until we get nothing (the empty set).
- This represents the contradiction.
- When we find this we can conclude the negation of the thing we added to the *KB*.
 - This is just the thing we want to prove.
- So we might combine:

$$\frac{\neg P_{2,1} \vee B_{1,1}, \quad \neg B_{1,1}}{\neg P_{2,1}}$$

- Similarly we might infer:


$$\frac{\neg P_{1,2} \vee B_{1,1}, \quad \neg B_{1,1}}{P_{1,2}}$$

and

$$\frac{P_{1,2} \quad \neg P_{1,2}}{\perp}$$

thus finding the contradiction and concluding the proof.

- Many of the possible inferences are summarised by:



```

function PL-RESOLUTION( $KB, \alpha$ ) returns true or false
  inputs:  $KB$ , the knowledge base, a sentence in propositional
            logic
             $\alpha$ , the query, a sentence in propositional logic
  clauses  $\leftarrow$  the set of clauses in the CNF representation of  $KB \wedge \neg\alpha$ 
  new  $\leftarrow$  { }
  loop do
    for each  $C_i, C_j$  in clauses do
      resolvents  $\leftarrow$  PL-RESOLVE( $C_i, C_j$ )
      if resolvents contains the empty clause then return true
      new  $\leftarrow$  new  $\cup$  resolvents
    if new  $\subseteq$  clauses then return false
  clauses  $\leftarrow$  clauses  $\cup$  new

```

In favor of propositional logic

- Propositional logic is *declarative*
 - Pieces of syntax correspond to facts
- Propositional logic allows partial/disjunctive/negated information
 - Unlike most data structures and databases
- Propositional logic is *compositional*
 - Meaning of $B_{1,1} \wedge P_{1,2}$ is derived from meaning of $B_{1,1}$ and of $P_{1,2}$
- Meaning in propositional logic is *context-independent*
 - Unlike natural language, where meaning depends on context

Against propositional logic

- Propositional logic has very limited expressive power
 - Unlike natural language
- For example, cannot say:
“pits cause breezes in adjacent squares”
except by writing one sentence for each square.

First order logic

- Whereas propositional logic assumes world contains *facts*, *first-order logic* (like natural language) assumes the world contains:
 - *Objects*: people, houses, numbers, theories, Barack Obama, colors, baseball games, wars, centuries . . .
 - *Relations*: red, round, bogus, prime, multistoried . . ., *brother of*, bigger than, inside, part of, has color, occurred after, owns, comes between, . . .
Relations are statements that are true or false.
 - *Functions*: father of, best friend, third inning of, one more than, end of . . .
Functions return values.

- The line between functions and relations is sometimes confusing.
- This is a relation:

PresidentOf(UnitedStates, BarakObama)

which is currently true.

- This is a function:

PresidentOf(UnitedStates)

which currently returns the value *BarackObama*.

Logics in general

Language	Ontological Commitment	Epistemological Commitment
Propositional logic	facts	true/false/unknown
First-order logic	facts, objects, relations	true/false/unknown
Temporal logic	facts, objects, relations, times	true/false/unknown
Probability theory	facts	degree of belief
Fuzzy logic	facts + degree of truth	known interval value

Syntax of FOL: Basic elements

Constants *KingJohn, 2, UCB, ...*

Predicates *Brother, >, ...*

Functions *Sqrt, LeftLegOf, ...*

Variables *x, y, a, b, ...*

Connectives $\wedge \vee \neg \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow$

Equality =

Quantifiers $\forall \exists$

- Predicates express *relations* between things.


Atomic sentences

Atomic sentence = $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or $term_1 = term_2$

Term = $function(term_1, \dots, term_n)$
or *constant* or *variable*

E.g., $Brother(KingJohn, RichardTheLionheart)$
> $(Length(LeftLegOf(Richard)), Length(LeftLegOf(KingJohn)))$

- The brothers we are talking about:



Complex sentences

- Complex sentences are made from atomic sentences using connectives

$$\neg S, \quad S_1 \wedge S_2, \quad S_1 \vee S_2, \quad S_1 \Rightarrow S_2, \quad S_1 \Leftrightarrow S_2$$

E.g. $Sibling(KingJohn, Richard) \Rightarrow Sibling(Richard, KingJohn)$


$$>(1, 2) \vee \leq(1, 2)$$

$$>(1, 2) \wedge \neg >(1, 2)$$

Truth in first-order logic

- Sentences are true with respect to a *model* and an *interpretation*
(Remember that in propositional logic, these ideas were interchangeable)
- Model contains ≥ 1 objects (*domain elements*) and relations among them
- Interpretation specifies referents for:
 - constant symbols \rightarrow **objects**
 - predicate symbols \rightarrow **relations**
 - function symbols \rightarrow **functional relations**
- An atomic sentence $predicate(term_1, \dots, term_n)$ is true iff the **objects** referred to by $term_1, \dots, term_n$ are in the **relation** referred to by $predicate$

Models for FOL: Example



Truth example

- Consider the interpretation in which
 - *Richard* → Richard the Lionheart
 - *John* → the evil King John
 - *Brother* → the brotherhood relation
- Under this interpretation, *Brother*(*Richard*, *John*) is true just in case Richard the Lionheart and the evil King John are in the brotherhood relation in the model.
- If the model is Northern Europe in the years 1166 to 1199, then the interpretation is true.

Models for FOL: Lots!

- Entailment in propositional logic can be computed by enumerating models
- We *can* enumerate the FOL models for a given KB vocabulary:
 - For each number of domain elements n from 1 to ∞
 - For each k -ary predicate P_k in the vocabulary
 - For each possible k -ary relation on n objects
 - For each constant symbol C in the vocabulary
 - For each choice of referent for C from n objects . . .
- Computing entailment by enumerating FOL models is not easy!

Decidability

- In fact, it is worse than “not easy”.
- Is there any procedure that we can use, that will be guaranteed to tell us, in a finite amount of time, whether a FOL formula is, or is not, valid?
- The answer is **no**.
- FOL is for this reason said to be *undecidable*.

Universal quantification

- $\forall \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$
- Everyone at Brooklyn College is smart:

$$\forall x \text{ At}(x, BC) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

- $\forall x$ P is true in a model m iff P is true with x being *each* possible object in the model
- *Roughly* speaking, equivalent to the conjunction of instantiations of P

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, BC) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn})) \\ \wedge & (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, BC) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(\text{Richard})) \\ \wedge & (\text{At}(BC, BC) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(BC)) \\ \wedge & \dots \end{aligned}$$

A common mistake to avoid

- Typically, \Rightarrow is the main connective with \forall
- Common mistake: using \wedge as the main connective with \forall :

$$\forall x \text{ At}(x, BC) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

means “Everyone is at Brooklyn College and everyone is smart”

Existential quantification

- $\exists \langle \text{variables} \rangle \langle \text{sentence} \rangle$

- Someone at City College is smart:

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{City}) \wedge \text{Smart}(x)$$

- $\exists x P$ is true in a model m iff P is true with x being *some* possible object in the model

- *Roughly* speaking, equivalent to the **disjunction** of instantiations of P :

$$\begin{aligned} & (\text{At}(\text{KingJohn}, \text{City}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{KingJohn})) \\ \vee & (\text{At}(\text{Richard}, \text{City}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{Richard})) \\ \vee & (\text{At}(\text{City}, \text{City}) \wedge \text{Smart}(\text{City})) \\ \vee & \dots \end{aligned}$$

A common mistake to avoid (2)

- Typically, \wedge is the main connective with \exists
- Common mistake: using \Rightarrow as the main connective with \exists :

$$\exists x \text{ At}(x, \text{City}) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$$

is true if there is anyone who is not at City College!

Properties of quantifiers

- $\forall x \forall y$ is the same as $\forall y \forall x$ (why?)
- $\exists x \exists y$ is the same as $\exists y \exists x$ (why?)
- $\exists x \forall y$ is *not* the same as $\forall y \exists x$
- $\exists x \forall y \text{ Loves}(x, y)$
“There is a person who loves everyone in the world”
- $\forall y \exists x \text{ Loves}(x, y)$
“Everyone in the world is loved by at least one person”
- **Quantifier duality:** each can be expressed using the other

$$\forall x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{IceCream}) \quad \neg \exists x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{IceCream})$$

$$\exists x \text{ Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli}) \quad \neg \forall x \neg \text{Likes}(x, \text{Broccoli})$$

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings

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$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$$

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings

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- “Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$$

- One’s mother is one’s female parent

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings

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- “Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$$

- One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y)$$

- “Sibling” is symmetric

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \text{Sibling}(y, x)$$

- One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

- A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

Fun with sentences

- Brothers are siblings

$$\forall x, y \text{ Brother}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Sibling}(x, y)$$

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- One’s mother is one’s female parent

$$\forall x, y \text{ Mother}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow (\text{Female}(x) \wedge \text{Parent}(x, y))$$

- A first cousin is a child of a parent’s sibling

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, y \text{ FirstCousin}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow \\ \exists p, ps \text{ Parent}(p, x) \wedge \text{Sibling}(ps, p) \wedge \text{Parent}(ps, y) \end{aligned}$$

Equality

- $term_1 = term_2$ is true under a given interpretation if and only if $term_1$ and $term_2$ refer to the same object

E.g., $1 = 2$ and $\forall x \times (Sqrt(x), Sqrt(x)) = x$ are satisfiable
 $2 = 2$ is valid

- E.g., definition of (full) *Sibling* in terms of *Parent*:

$$\forall x, y \text{ Sibling}(x, y) \Leftrightarrow [\neg(x = y) \wedge \exists m, f \neg(m = f) \wedge \\ \text{Parent}(m, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, x) \wedge \text{Parent}(m, y) \wedge \text{Parent}(f, y)]$$

Interacting with FOL KBs

- Suppose a wumpus-world agent is using an FOL KB and perceives a smell and a breeze (but no glitter) at $t = 5$:
- $Tell(KB, Percept([Smell, Breeze, None], 5))$
 $Ask(KB, \exists a \text{ Action}(a, 5))$
- Does KB entail any particular actions at $t = 5$?
- Answer: *Yes*, $\{a/Shoot\}$ ← *substitution* (binding list)
- Given a sentence S and a substitution σ , $S\sigma$ denotes the result of plugging σ into S

- For example:

$$S = \textit{Smarter}(x, y)$$

$$\sigma = \{x/\textit{Hillary}, y/\textit{Bill}\}$$

$$S\sigma = \textit{Smarter}(\textit{Hillary}, \textit{Bill})$$

- $\textit{Ask}(KB, S)$ returns some/all σ such that $KB \models S\sigma$

Knowledge base for the wumpus world

- “Perception”

$$\forall b, g, t \text{ Percept}([Smell, b, g], t) \Rightarrow Smell(t)$$

$$\forall s, b, t \text{ Percept}([s, b, Glitter], t) \Rightarrow AtGold(t)$$

- Reflex

$$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$$

- Reflex with internal state: do we have the gold already?

$$\forall t \text{ AtGold}(t) \wedge \neg \text{Holding}(Gold, t) \Rightarrow \text{Action}(Grab, t)$$

- $\text{Holding}(Gold, t)$ cannot be observed \Rightarrow keeping track of change is essential

function **KB-AGENT**(*percept*) **returns** an *action*
static: *KB*, a knowledge base
 t, a counter, initially 0, indicating time
TELL(*KB*, MAKE-PERCEPT-SENTENCE(*percept*, *t*))
action ← ASK(*KB*, MAKE-ACTION-QUERY(*t*))
TELL(*KB*, MAKE-ACTION-SENTENCE(*action*, *t*))
t ← *t* + 1
return *action*

Deducing hidden properties

- Properties of locations:

$$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Smelt}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Smelly}(x)$$

$$\forall x, t \text{ At}(\text{Agent}, x, t) \wedge \text{Breeze}(t) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(x)$$

- Squares are breezy near a pit.
- *Diagnostic* rule—infer cause from effect

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Rightarrow \exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)$$

- *Causal* rule—infer effect from cause

$$\forall x, y \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y) \Rightarrow \text{Breezy}(y)$$

- Neither of these is complete—e.g., the causal rule doesn't say whether squares far away from pits can be breezy
- *Definition* for the *Breezy* predicate:

$$\forall y \text{ Breezy}(y) \Leftrightarrow [\exists x \text{ Pit}(x) \wedge \text{Adjacent}(x, y)]$$

Proof in FOL

- Proof in FOL is similar to propositional logic; we just need an extra set of rules, to deal with the quantifiers.
- FOL *inherits* all the rules of PL.
- To understand FOL proof rules, need to understand *substitution*.
- The most obvious rule, for \forall -E.

Tells us that if everything in the domain has some property, then we can infer that any *particular* individual has the property.

$$\frac{\vdash \forall x \cdot P(x)}{\vdash P(a)} \quad \forall\text{-E} \quad \text{for any } a \text{ in the domain}$$

Going from *general* to *specific*.

- If all Brooklyn College students are smart, then anyone in the class is smart.

- Example 1.

Let's use \forall -E to get the Socrates example out of the way.

$Person(s); \forall x \cdot Person(x) \Rightarrow Mortal(x) \vdash Mortal(s)$

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. $Person(s)$ | Given |
| 2. $\forall x \cdot Person(x) \Rightarrow Mortal(x)$ | Given |
| 3. $Person(s) \Rightarrow Mortal(s)$ | 2, \forall -E |
| 4. $Mortal(s)$ | 1, 3, \Rightarrow -E |

- We can also go from the general to the slightly less specific!

$$\frac{\vdash \forall x \cdot P(x)}{\vdash \exists x \cdot P(x)} \quad \exists\text{-I(1) if domain not empty}$$

Note the *side condition*.

The \exists quantifier *asserts the existence* of at least one object.

The \forall quantifier does not.

- So, while we can say “All unicorns have horns” irrespective of whether unicorns are real or not, we can only say “There’s a unicorn living on my street whose name is Fred and he has a horn” if there is at least one unicorn.



- This is Fred.

- We can also go from the very specific to less specific.

$$\frac{\vdash P(a); \quad \quad \quad \exists\text{-I}(2)}{\vdash \exists x \cdot P(x)}$$

- In other words once we have a concrete example, we can infer there exists something with the property of that example.
- If I find a student at City College who is smart, I can say “There is a smart student at City College”.

- There's a \exists elimination rule also.
- We often informally make use of arguments along the lines...
 1. We know somebody is the murderer.
 2. Call this person a .
 3. a must have been in the library with the lead pipe.
 4. ...

(Here, a is called a *Skolem constant*.)



Thoralf Skolem

- We have a rule which allows this, but we have to be careful how we use it!

$$\frac{\vdash \exists x \cdot P(x); \quad \exists\text{-E}}{\vdash P(a)} \quad a \text{ doesn't occur elsewhere}$$

- Here is an *invalid* use of this rule:

1. $\exists x \cdot \text{Boring}(x)$ Given
2. $\text{Lecture}(AI)$ Given
3. $\text{Boring}(AI)$ 1, \exists -E

- (The conclusion may be true, the argument isn't sound.)

- Another kind of reasoning:
 - Let a be arbitrary object.
 - ... (some reasoning) ...
 - Therefore a has property P
 - Since a was arbitrary, it must be that every object has property P .

- Common in mathematics:

Consider a positive integer n ... so n is either a prime number or divisible by a smaller prime number ... thus every positive integer is either a prime number or divisible by a smaller prime number.

- If we are careful, we can also use this kind of reasoning:

$$\frac{\vdash P(a);}{\vdash \forall x \cdot P(x)} \quad \forall\text{-I} \quad a \text{ is arbitrary}$$

- Here's an invalid use of this rule:

1. *Boring*(AI) Given
2. $\forall x \cdot \textit{Boring}(x)$ 1, $\forall\text{-I}$

- With this we have a full set of rules for handling quantifiers.
- Adding them to the rules we had before, we have enough to do natural deduction with predicate logic.
- Let's look at an example.

- An example:

1. Everybody is either happy or rich.
2. Simon is not rich.
3. Therefore, Simon is happy.

Predicates:

- $H(x)$ means x is happy;
- $R(x)$ means x is rich.

- Formalisation:

$$\forall x.H(x) \vee R(x); \neg R(\text{Simon}) \vdash H(\text{Simon})$$

1. $\forall x.H(x) \vee R(x)$	Given
2. $\neg R(\text{Simon})$	Given
3. $H(\text{Simon}) \vee R(\text{Simon})$	1, \forall -E
4. $\neg H(\text{Simon}) \Rightarrow R(\text{Simon})$	3, defn \Rightarrow
5. $\neg H(\text{Simon})$	As.
6. $R(\text{Simon})$	4, 5, \Rightarrow -E
7. $R(\text{Simon}) \wedge \neg R(\text{Simon})$	2, 6, \wedge -I
8. $\neg\neg H(\text{Simon})$	5, 7, \neg -I
9. $H(\text{Simon}) \Leftrightarrow \neg\neg H(\text{Simon})$	PL axiom
10. $(H(\text{Simon}) \Rightarrow \neg\neg H(\text{Simon}))$ $\quad \wedge (\neg\neg H(\text{Simon}) \Rightarrow H(\text{Simon}))$	9, defn \Leftrightarrow
11. $\neg\neg H(\text{Simon}) \Rightarrow H(\text{Simon})$	10, \wedge -E
12. $H(\text{Simon})$	8, 11, \Rightarrow -E

- To summarise where we stand with logics and proof systems:

	Propositional Logic	Predicate Logic
Natural Deduction	X	X
Forward Chaining	X	
Backward Chaining	X	
Resolution	X	

- We could, quite easily, extend FC, BC and resolution for predicate logic.
 - We already know how to handle quantifiers, and that is the hardest bit.

Summary

- This lecture completes our treatment of logic.
- We have added some new proof techniques:
 - Forward chaining
 - Backward chaining
 - Resolution

to our treatment of propositional logic; and

- Covered the basics of first order logic.
- There is plenty more to logic (a whole other chapter in the textbook) but we will look at other things next week.