Towards robust multi-agent systems: Handling communication exceptions in double auctions

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Abstract

This paper addresses an important question in the development of multi-agent systems—how can we create robust systems out of the often unreliable agents and infrastructures we can expect to find in an open systems’ context? Here we examine an approach based on distinct exception handling services, and apply it to systems performing resource allocation by means of a double auction.

1. Introduction

This paper studies the following question. “How can we develop robust multi-agent systems from the kind of unreliable agents and infrastructures we can expect to find in an open systems’ context? Here we examine an approach based on distinct exception handling services, and apply it to systems performing resource allocation by means of a double auction.

2. Exception handling

One way to deal with exceptions is to elaborate the individual agents so that they are able to cope with all the exceptions that they might face. Most previous research on dealing with exceptions has taken this approach. This survivalist approach to exception handling faces a number of serious shortcomings.

First, developing survivalist agents greatly increases the burden on agent developers. For this to be an effective approach, all the agents have to include carefully coordinated and provided with potentially complex mechanisms for exception handling. Second, the survivalist approach can lead to poor exception handling. In open systems it is always possible that some agents won’t have the necessary exception handling code, or may violate some of the assumptions built into the exception handling operated by others.

In order to overcome these limitations Klein et al. [4] suggested attaining robustness by off-loading exception handling to distinct domain-independent services. We refer to this as the citizen approach, by analogy with the way that exceptions are handled in human society. The key insight in the citizen approach is that highly reusable and domain independent exception handling expertise can be separated from the knowledge that agents use to achieve their main tasks.

Previous work on the citizen approach has found that every coordination protocol has its own set of domain-independent exceptions, and that these can be turned into domain-independent strategies for handling exceptions [4].
This paper extends this earlier work to a new set of coordination protocols—auction protocols—identifying a new set of exceptions and exception handling mechanisms. Due to the popularity of auctions in the agents community, we believe that these results will be interesting to a large number of agent developers.

3. Exception handling in double auctions

Double auctions are markets that include both buyers and sellers. A classic example of a double auction was the trading pit at the old Chicago Board of Trade. Here buyers and sellers, or rather human agents operating on their behalf, would call out offers, bids—offers to buy a good at a given price—or asks—offers to sell a good at a given price. Although such markets have long since become electronic, the same basic principles apply with buyers and sellers “gathering” in a virtual space in which bids and asks are broadcast. When a bid is greater than an ask, a trade is possible, and a price between the bid price and the ask price is decided on as the trade price. This is a continuous double auction in which a trade is possible after every offer, another periodic variant of the double auction collects bids and asks until some deadline and then finds possible trades [1].

To provide a citizen approach to exception handling we associate a sentinel with every agent through which all messages to and from an agent pass. These sentinels can then provide exception handling services. For example, sentinels can handle corrupted messages. Assuming that corruption is introduced stochastically on the link between the sentinels, a sentinel can identify a corrupted message and organise for it to be resent by the sentinel of the issuing agent.

The advantage of the citizen approach is that the mechanisms for detecting and resolving the exceptions, the exception handlers, are generic. Exactly the same mechanisms can be used for other classes of auction since (as described elsewhere [5]) the specific exceptions that are detected and resolved by for a double auction may be found across all kinds of auction, and so may be handled by the same mechanisms. Indeed, these kinds of exception—exceptions due to message delay, loss and corruption—will be common to all coordination mechanisms operating over unreliable infrastructures, and potentially the same handlers can be used for a wide range of multi-agent systems.

4. Results

The main contribution of the work reported here is that we have implemented and empirically evaluated the kind of exception handling mechanism described above in the context of a continuous double auction. The results are explored at length in the full paper—here we briefly sketch them.

We measured the impact of (1) message corruption and (2) the loss of messages telling agents to start bidding on the allocative efficiency of, and the number of messages passed during, a small double auction with 10 buyers and 10 sellers. We performed this test for agents using a range of bidding mechanisms common in the literature, and found that (unsurprisingly) for all types the exceptions caused a loss of efficiency. We then performed the same test when suitable exception handlers were switched on, and found that most of the lost efficiency was restored at the cost of only a modest increase in the number of messages. This seems to indicate that our approach to exception handling is effective in a double auction setting.

5. Conclusions

This paper studied the question “How can we develop robust multi-agent systems from unreliable components?”, and proposed the use of domain-independent exception handling services as a solution. In the context of multi-agent systems that implement double auctions, we showed empirically that the particular exception handling approach described here is able to provide this robustness.

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References


1 Allocative efficiency is a standard economic measure which estimates how much profit the auction extracts from agents.