Reading Guide: David Chalmers, "A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition"

Take a deep breath.

Spend some time on the second paragraph of the long abstract--this is where he tells us what he's going to do. Remember that he's going to try make an argument (or a few of them). See if you can give an outline, from the abstract, of what the structure of this argument will be. Even if you're not sure what each step means, you should be able to tell from his language how he's going to try to string ideas together.

Introduction

What does he mean by computational sufficiency? Do you have an idea of what he means by "computational structure"? (If not, you can hope he'll provide some more detail later in the paper.)

What is computational explanation?

Does his explanation of the controversy around these ideas help you understand them more fully?

In the fourth paragraph, why is he so concerned with implementation? Can you tell what Searle thinks? Why does Chalmers call Searle pessimistic?

A Theory of Implementation

The first part of this section (up until subsection 2.2) is pretty abstract; it's OK just to skim it on your first reading and jump to 2.2.

2.2 Questions answered

What is "isomorphism"? What does he mean by "formal structure" and "causal structure"?

For each of the questions he answers in this section, explain why it's important to ask the question.

Right at the end of this section, he makes a clear distinction between "brain" and "computer." Explain what this distinction is and why it's important.

Computation and cognition

In the second paragraph, he says, "Causal organization is the nexus between computation and cognition." What does that mean?

Organizational invariance

Try to come with a few more examples of properties that are not organizational invariants (maybe we'll discuss a few in class).

The organizational invariance of mental properties

Restate Chalmers's distinction between psychological and <>phenomenal properties. Why does he make this distinction? Do you think it works?

Justifying the theses

Summarize the idea of "strong artificial intelligence."

Some objections

Chalmers says his argument so far shows that "It follows that a model that is computationally equivalent to a mind will itself be a mind." Do you agree that this is the implication of his argument?

Note that the discussion of "syntax and semantics" has a useful discussion of causation

Can you think of objections to Chalmers' argument beyond those he addresses in this paper?

Other kinds of computationalism

How does symbolic computationalism differ from the idea Chalmers is presenting?

Conclusion: Toward a minimal computationalism

Why does he call his view minimal computationalism?

Whew.