cis3.2 electronic commerce 29 nov 2005 lecture # 17 internet security

topics:

- overview of internet security
- types of attacks
- requirements for security
- basic principles of cryptography
- symmetric (single key) and asymmetric (public key) methods

reading: Ince chapter 11

slide credits: – Peter McBurney, Univ of Liverpool

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why is there lack of security

- Internet and WWW computing standards (IP, HTTP, etc.) are public. Security problems arise from the Internet and WWW being open and distributed systems.
- The Internet is open and pervasive. Anyone may connect to it, and connections are everywhere.
- The Internet has many interconnecting components. e.g., a message from one computer to another will pass over many others, thus giving these others opportunities for espionage, etc.
- Web servers are extensible: they can be connected to all types of technologies (e.g., database servers) which may transform their functionality.
- Development speeds are very fast. Until recently, security has often been ignored in software development!
- HTML/HTTP were not designed for e-commerce but for document storage and transfer. e.g., browsers had limited functionality initially.

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overview of internet security • overriding question: *how can we guarantee security?* • what makes e-commerce applications insecure • what forms of attack are possible • what are the security requirements for distributed and open systems

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forms of attack

• Threats to integrity —

e.g., an intruder modifies data stored in a database (like a credit card balances) or data is modified in transit.

- Confidentiality threats Reading private data of a company or an individual (e.g., stealing credit card details)
- Denial-of-service threats (threats to availability) Doing something which prevents a web-server from fulfilling its function; e.g., flooding a web-server with requests and thus overloading it.
- Authentication threats Pretending to be someone who you are not

types of attacks Passive attacks Confidentiality - Eavesdropping on messages - Traffic analysis — An eavesdropper may be able to guess the content of a message by looking at the pattern of traffic; e.g., cold war Authentication warning systems Active attacks say they are. - Masquerades - Pretending to be someone whom you are not - Replay attacks - Capturing a data unit and retransmission for an Integrity unauthorized effect. - Modification-of-message attacks - Denial-of-service attacks Non-repudiation place. cis3.2-fall2005-sklar-lec17 cis3.2-fall2005-sklar-lec17

Access control

- Only authorized users are able to access resources within a system.
- Availability
 - The resources of a system are available to authorized users when they need to use them.
 - Protection against denial-of-service attacks

security requirements

- Information should not be accessible by unauthorized parties.
- Protect against passive attacks.
- Make sure that the originator of a message or transaction is who they
- Protect against masquerades and replay.
- Only authorized parties are able to change data, and only under pre-defined circumstances.
- Protect against modification-of-message attacks.
- Neither the sender nor the receiver of a message can deny that it took

examples of attacks

- Low-tech attacks
 - Guessing passwords
 - Stealing passwords
 - Taking advantage of poor physical or clerical controls, e.g., bank employees creating fictitious accounts
 - Soliciting information from users which appears to be genuine but is not, e.g., pop-up windows masquerading as the on-line seller but are not
- Destructive devices
 - E-mail bomb An email with a very large attachment, thus overwhelming the connection.
 - Denial-of-service attacks
 - * Programs which spawn others, which in turn spawn others, etc.
 - * The ping of death (Ince p. 213) Packets of data larger than
 - permitted by TCP-IP often cause the receiving computer to crash.

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viruses

- Malignant code which attaches itself to files resident on a computer. When run, it may delete or overwrite files, or send malicious emails.
- Types of viruses:
 - Executable virus: attaches to an executable file.
 - Data virus: infects a file containing data (e.g., a startup file)
 - Device driver virus: infects the device drivers of a system
- Anti-virus software Usually looks for known viruses or for sudden changes in the size and content of files.
- Clever viruses work against anti-virus software e.g., by mutating: changing their form or location ("polymorphic viruses") or by hiding themselves in other files ("stealth viruses")

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- May be able to detect passwords.

- Trojan Horses
 - Code which looks legitimate but executes something not expected or authorized.
 - Difficult to detect, because they often masquerade as utilities, e.g., file compression programs.
- Spoofing
 - Using one computer to masquerade as another, where the latter has privileged access to some third system

other attacks

- Scanners
 - A program which detects security weaknesses
 - Usually developed to help human system administrators to find security flaws.
 - Looks at the components of an Operating System and checks for security
- Password crackers
 - Software which attempts to find passwords (e.g., by randomly generating all, or most likely, possibilities)
 - Often use common words (e.g., "password", "pword")
- Sniffers
 - Devices which read the packets of data travelling on a network.
 - Usually used by system developers and administrators to assess system effectiveness.
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designing a secure system

- Assume two computers which wish to communicate over the Internet. We call these two the Principals.
- Techniques for security have two basic components:
 - Transformation of the information to be sent, e.g., putting a message into code before transmission.
 - Some secret information shared by the two principals but not by any opponent, e.g., the code to be used for transformation.
- A trusted third party may be necessary to ensure secure transmission.
- Design a security service
 - Design an algorithm for transforming the information to be communicated.
 - Generate the secret information to be used with the algorithm. e.g., the coding scheme.
 - Develop methods for the distribution and sharing of the secret information, e.g., via a trusted third party

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| Specify a protocol to be used by the two principals that uses the security algorithm and the secret information. | basic principles of cryptography |
|---|--|
| | Messages are put into code (encrypted) by the sender and decoded (decrypted) by the receiver. |
| | Basic ingredients of conventional cryptography: |
| | – Plain text input |
| | - Encryption algorithm |
| | Secret key shared by sender and recipient Cipher text (coded input text) |
| | - Decryption algorithm |
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| cryptography example | requirements |
| Suppose input text is | An analyzation algorithm is peopled. The condex must have this. The |
| • Suppose input text is THE SKY IS BLUE | An encryption algorithm is needed. The sender must have this. The receiver must have a decryption algorithm, which undoes the encryption |
| Algorithm: | algorithm. |
| | Gigonnini. |
| Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. | Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against |
| Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. • Key: 1 | Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against attack. This is usually stated as follows: An opponent should be unable to |
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| Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. • Key: 1 • Output: UIF TLZ JT CMVF | Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against attack. This is usually stated as follows: An opponent should be unable to decrypt the ciphertext or discover the key even if s/he is in possession of a |
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| Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. Key: 1 Output: UIF TLZ JT CMVF A key of 2 would produce: | Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against attack. This is usually stated as follows: An opponent should be unable to decrypt the ciphertext or discover the key even if s/he is in possession of a number of ciphertexts together with the plain text which produced them. Both sender and receiver must have the secret key(s) for the process to work. This is the key weakness of symmetric encryption methods. Note: the security of conventional encryption depends on the secrecy of the key, not secrecy of the algorithm. It is usually assumed that it is impractical to decrypt a message on the basis of the ciphertext plus |
| Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. Key: 1 Output: UIF TLZ JT CMVF A key of 2 would produce: VJG UMA KU DNWG The process used here is called <i>substitution</i> — substituting one element (in | Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against attack. This is usually stated as follows: An opponent should be unable to decrypt the ciphertext or discover the key even if s/he is in possession of a number of ciphertexts together with the plain text which produced them. Both sender and receiver must have the secret key(s) for the process to work. This is the key weakness of symmetric encryption methods. Note: the security of conventional encryption depends on the secrecy of the key, not secrecy of the algorithm. It is usually assumed that it is |

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e.g. TLZ UIF JT CMVF

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classification of cryptographic systems

- The type of operations used to transform plaintext to ciphertext:
 - substitution
 - transposition
 - Usually some complex combination of these is used.
 - In any case, no information can be lost in the process.
- Whether sender and receiver use the same keys
 - symmetric: sender and receiver use the same keys
 - asymmetric: sender and receiver use different keys
- The number of keys used
- How the plaintext is processed.
 - A *block cipher* processes the input one block of elements at a time, producing an output block for each input block.
 - A stream cipher processes the input elements continuously, producing one element at a time as it goes along.

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- differential cryptanalysis attack:

- * The opponent gets the computer doing the encryption to encrypt several blocks of text which differ only slightly; e.g., the opponent then looks at the differences in the ciphertext.
- differential fault analysis:
 - * The opponent attacks the hardware of the encryption computer to force it to make mistakes, in order to discover the key or algorithm.

cryptanalysis

- the process of attempting to discover the plaintext or the key.
- Types of attack:
 - known plain text attack:
 - * The opponent has a sample of plaintext and ciphertext, and from this infers the keys; e.g., he may use brute force to try lots of different keys until successful.
 - * Note that plain text may be compressed and may be numerical in origin, so brute force methods usually require some knowledge of the type of plain text used.
 - \ast For a key of length 128 bits, it would take an opponent about 10^{18} years to crack!
 - chosen plain text attack:
 - * The opponent gets the computer doing the encryption to encrypt some specially-chosen text (chosen to give clues about the ciphertext); e.g., the blocks may have many blanks or repeated words.

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some symmetric algorithms

- Data Encryption Standard (DES)
 - US Government standard in use 1977–1998.
 - Algorithm works on blocks of data (each 64-bits), and uses a 56-bit key.
 - Decertified in 1998 and replaced by 3DEA.
 - Possible to crack with brute force to find the key (i.e. key is too short).
- Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (3DEA)
 - Proposed in 1979, became a standard in 1999.
 - Applies the DES algorithm 3 times to plain text:
 Encrypt with Key A, decrypt with Key B, encrypt with Key C.
 Decryption is the reverse with the keys reversed: Decrypt with Key C, encrypt with Key B, decrypt with Key A.
 - Each key of length 56 bits, so effective key length of 168 bits.

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location of encryption devices

• Where should the encryption occur:

- End-to-end encryption The entire message is encrypted
- Link encryption Each link along the way is encrypted; not as secure as end-to-end.
- Note, that end-to-end encryption can only encrypt the data portion (contents) of packets and not their headers, since the headers contain destination and sourcing information. Thus, the traffic pattern is not secure.
- Both methods can be used together. One key and method for the end-to-end encryption of data portion of packets. One key and method for the link encryption of the packet header.

key distribution

- the most important weakness of symmetric encryption.
- How do computers A and B agree their keys?
- Options:
 - 1. A selects key and delivers it physically to B.
 - 2. A third party C selects the key and delivers it physically to both A and B.
 - 3. If A and B have previously used a key, they could send a new key using an encrypted message.
 - 4. If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third-party C, C could deliver a new key to each of A and B on encrypted links.
- For link encryption, options 1 and 2 may be feasible. But these are not usually feasible for end-to-end encryption.
- Option 3 is vulnerable: If an opponent ever finds a key, all future communications can be read.

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asymmetric (or public) key algorithms

- Similar to symmetric key encryption, but we use at least 2 keys: One for encryption (the public key), and one for decryption (the private key).
- The steps involved are:
 - Keys are generated in pairs, a public key and a private key, by each person or computer (say Bob).
 - The public key is made public (e.g., on a web-site) by Bob.
 - Anyone who wants to send a message to Bob, uses his public key.
 - Bob decodes the message using his private key.
- This approach dates from 1976.
- Public key methods are not necessarily more secure than symmetric algorithms. But there is a larger computational overhead, and this makes brute-force attacks harder to execute successfully.

requirements for public key algorithms

- It is computationally easy for party B to generate a pair of keys.
- It is computationally easy for sender A to generate the cipher text on the basis of the plain text and the public key.
- It is computationally easy for party B to decrypt the resulting ciphertext using his private key and so generate the plain text.
- It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to determine the private key from the public key.
- It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to recover the original plain text from the public key and the ciphertext.
- In addition, we may require (not necessary but nice to have): Either of the two related keys may be used for encryption with the other used for decryption.

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applications of public key methods

- Encryption sending coded messages.
- Authentication -

when we want to be certain that the sender of a message is actually the person (or computer) they say they are. The sender of the message uses his private key to encrypt the message. Only his public key will be able to decode the message.

• Digital Signature —

The sender "signs" a message using his private key. This application is similar to authentication.

• Key Exchange —

Two parties co-operate to exchange a session key, using the private key of one or both parties.

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authentication using asymmetric keys

- Here we use the public and private keys in reverse order to encryption.
- Alice sends a message to Bob
 - Alice encrypts the message using her private key, which only she knows.
 - Bob receives the cipher text, and decrypts it using Alice's public key.
 - If Alice really did send the message, the output should be plain text.
 - If someone else (say, Mary) sent the message, then Alice's public key will not work on this message.
- So, this provides a way to authenticate a message, assuming the private key has not been stolen or somehow made public.
- Note that this method does not keep the message secret. Anyone can use Alice's public key (since it is public!) to decode Alice's message.
- This approach is also used for Digital Signatures, analogous to personal signatures on checks.

public key algorithms

• RSA algorithm

- Developed by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman at MIT in 1977
- RSA is a block cipher in which the plaintext and cipher text are integers between 0 and (n-1) for some n. If M is the plaintext number, and C is the cipher text number, the algorithm works as follows:
 - * Encryption algorithm: $C = M^e \mod n$
 - * Decryption algorithm: $M = C^d \mod n$
- Both sender and receiver must know the values of n and e. The public key is a pair of numbers (e,n).
- Only the receiver knows the value of d. The private key is the pair of numbers (d,n).
- Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 - A standard agreed in 1993 for digital signatures in the American National Institute of Standards.
 - Only used for digital signatures (not for encryption or key exchange).

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how to distribute public keys?

- Answer is simple: put on your web-site, email your friends, shout it from the roof-tops!
- But if Alice gets an email from Bob telling her that 1023 is his public key, how does she know it really is his? Maybe someone is impersonating him and sending out a false key in his name!
- Digital Certificates seek to get around this. A user (e.g., Bob) presents his public key to a trusted third party and receives a digital certificate. The certificate contains a public key together with a a user ID for the key owner (Bob), all signed by the third party.
- Examples of third parties: Government agencies or a bank. The user (Bob) can then give the digital certificate to anyone else (e.g., Alice).
- A standard for digital certificates is X.509.

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public key distribution of symmetric keys

- How do 2 parties share a symmetric key? These are also called secret keys, to distinguish them from public and private keys.
- They could deliver them physically (e.g., by courier).
- If they already share a secret key, they could send the new one by encrypted message.
- They could use public key certificates, as follows:
 - 1. Bob sends Alice his public key using a public key certificate.
 - 2. Alice prepares a message.
 - 3. Alice encrypts the message using one-off symmetric key for this session, e.g., she uses a session key.
 - 4. Alice encrypts the session key using Bob's public key.
 - 5. Alice attaches the encrypted session key to the message and sends it to Bob.

Only Bob is able to decrypt the session key (since only he has his private key). So, only Bob can read the original message.

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