

- \* SMTP: simple mail transfer protocol (transfers mail msgs from one computer to another)
- \* kerberos: security protocol (allows transfer of highly confidential data)
- \* DNS: domain name system (enables symbolic instead of numeric host naming)
- \* NFS: network file system (allows sharing of files between computers)
- TCP: can re-transmit if errors
- UDP: no error checking, fast messaging
- IP: i.e., moving data via TCP or UDP
- ICMP = internet control message protocol (checks status of computers with other network devices)



internet addresses and domain names

- example: prefix number number IP address 130.5.5.25  $\rightarrow$  130.5. .5 .25
- domain names
  - provides a more convenient way to address a computer on the internet than the numeric  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{IP}}$  address

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- structured hierarchically (e.g., tree structure)
- $\verb"example: www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu"$
- common *domain names*: com, edu, gov, uk and other country-based domains
- name server: maintains correspondance between numeric IP address and domain names;
- $-\,\mathsf{DNS}=\mathsf{internet}$  domain name system  $=\mathsf{group}$  of domain name servers

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### network architecture: topologies

- bus (linear model; inexpensive to run cables, but not robust to node failure)
- ring (example: IBM token ring)
- star (can be expensive to run cables, but robust to node failure)
- hub (example: the internet)



# <section-header> open systems "a system whose architecture is not a secret" prime example: UNIX, LINUX — runs on many hardware platforms; LINUX is free protocol rules for how computers communicate with each other TCP: transmission control protocol (computer ↔ computer) UDP: user datagram protocol IP: internet protocol HTTP: hypertext transfer protocol (computer ↔ browser) distributed system nultiple computers are distributed geographically example: banking system

#### network architecture: Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model

- also called the 7-layer model:
  - 1. application layer (displays data, communicates with lower layers via presentation layer)
  - 2. presentation layer (link between app and lower layers; converts application layer data to forms understandable by other layers, and back; translates the "meaning" of the bits)
  - 3. session layer (exchange of data between applications "dialog" and synchronization between applications)
  - 4. transport layer (transfer of data through network; effects flow control; provides some error recovery)
  - 5. network layer (physical routing of data from one computer to another; facilitates sender finding receiver)
  - 6. data link layer (manages transmissions of low-level data; detects and corrects transmission errors)
  - 7. physical layer (sends electronic signals, or "bits" 0's and 1's) (usually linked to above)
- Here's a phrase to remember the layers: "All people seem to need data processing."



#### • information formats

- "information units" are passed from one layer to another; "headers" are added as information passes from upper to lower layer
- terminology is defined below (it is often not used clearly or precisely):
- \* frame = information unit whose source and destination are the data link layer
- \* *packet* = information unit whose source and destination are the *network* layer
- \* segment = information unit whose source and destination are the transport layer
- $\ast$  message = information unit whose source and destination are the application, presentation or session layers
- \* *datagram* = information unit in a "connectionless" network (see below)

#### network communication: ports and sockets

#### • port

- network conduit on a computer through which a connection to/from other computers is made
- certain numbers are commonly associated with certain services; e.g., port 80  $\rightarrow$  http
- allows two-way communication
- NOT a hardware concept (NOT like "USB port" or "printer port")
- $\mbox{ users can define their own network ports and use them for user-specific applications}$
- socket:
  - $\ensuremath{\mathsf{a}}$  network connection implemented in software
  - i.e., a program has to open a "socket" on a computer (using an IP address and a port number) to reach another program on another computer

#### cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

connection-oriented vs connectionless networks

• "connection-oriented"

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- like a telephone
- first a connection must be established, then data is transferred, finally the connection is closed
- e.g., TCP
- $-\ensuremath{\,\text{monitors}}$  for lost packets and re-sends if necessary
- $-\ensuremath{\,\text{more}}$  overhead than connectionless, but more reliable
- "connectionless"
  - like sending a letter in the mail:
  - there is no guarantee that the recipient ever gets the letter;
  - e.g., UDP
  - less overhead than connection-oriented, and less reliable

#### internet security

- overview of internet security
- types of attacks
- requirements for security
- basic principles of cryptography
- symmetric (single key) and asymmetric (public key) methods

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1



# • Authentication threats — Pretending to be someone who you are not



- Internet and WWW computing standards (IP, HTTP, etc.) are public. Security problems arise from the Internet and WWW being open and distributed systems.
- The Internet is open and pervasive. Anyone may connect to it, and connections are
- The Internet has many interconnecting components. e.g., a message from one computer to another will pass over many others, thus giving these others opportunities for espionage,
- Web servers are extensible: they can be connected to all types of technologies (e.g., database servers) which may transform their functionality.
- Development speeds are very fast. Until recently, security has often been ignored in software development!
- HTML/HTTP were not designed for e-commerce but for document storage and transfer. e.g., browsers had limited functionality initially.

### types of attacks

- - Eavesdropping on messages
  - Traffic analysis An eavesdropper may be able to guess the content of a message by looking at the pattern of traffic; e.g., cold war warning systems
- Masquerades Pretending to be someone whom you are not
- Replay attacks Capturing a data unit and retransmission for an unauthorized effect.
- Modification-of-message attacks
- Denial-of-service attacks

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### security requirements

#### Confidentiality

- Information should not be accessible by unauthorized parties.
- Protect against passive attacks.
- Authentication
- Make sure that the originator of a message or transaction is who they say they are.
- Protect against masquerades and replay.
- Integrity
  - Only authorized parties are able to change data, and only under pre-defined circumstances.
  - Protect against modification-of-message attacks.
- Non-repudiation
  - Neither the sender nor the receiver of a message can deny that it took place.
- Access control

#### cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

# examples of attacks

- Low-tech attacks
  - Guessing passwords
  - Stealing passwords
  - Taking advantage of poor physical or clerical controls, e.g., bank employees creating fictitious accounts
  - Soliciting information from users which appears to be genuine but is not, e.g., pop-up windows masquerading as the on-line seller but are not
- Destructive devices
  - E-mail bomb An email with a very large attachment, thus overwhelming the connection.
  - Denial-of-service attacks
    - \* Programs which spawn others, which in turn spawn others, etc.
  - $\ast$  The ping of death (Ince p. 213) Packets of data larger than permitted by TCP-IP often cause the receiving computer to crash.

- Only authorized users are able to access resources within a system.
- Availability
  - The resources of a system are available to authorized users when they need to use them.
  - Protection against denial-of-service attacks

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### viruses

- Malignant code which attaches itself to files resident on a computer. When run, it may delete or overwrite files, or send malicious emails.
- Types of viruses:
  - Executable virus: attaches to an executable file.
  - Data virus: infects a file containing data (e.g., a startup file)
  - Device driver virus: infects the device drivers of a system
- Anti-virus software Usually looks for known viruses or for sudden changes in the size and content of files.
- Clever viruses work against anti-virus software e.g., by mutating: changing their form or location ("polymorphic viruses") or by hiding themselves in other files ("stealth viruses")

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### other attacks

#### Scanners

- A program which detects security weaknesses
- Usually developed to help human system administrators to find security flaws.
- Looks at the components of an Operating System and checks for security
- Password crackers
  - Software which attempts to find passwords (e.g., by randomly generating all, or most likely, possibilities)
  - Often use common words (e.g., "password", "pword")

#### Sniffers

- Devices which read the packets of data travelling on a network.
- Usually used by system developers and administrators to assess system effectiveness.
- $-\ensuremath{\,\text{May}}$  be able to detect passwords.
- Trojan Horses
  - Code which looks legitimate but executes something not expected or authorized.

#### cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### designing a secure system

- Assume two computers which wish to communicate over the Internet. We call these two the Principals.
- Techniques for security have two basic components:
  - Transformation of the information to be sent, e.g., putting a message into code before transmission.
  - Some secret information shared by the two principals but not by any opponent, e.g., the code to be used for transformation.
- A trusted third party may be necessary to ensure secure transmission.
- Design a security service
  - Design an algorithm for transforming the information to be communicated.
  - Generate the secret information to be used with the algorithm. e.g., the coding scheme.
  - Develop methods for the distribution and sharing of the secret information, e.g., via a trusted third party
  - Specify a protocol to be used by the two principals that uses the security algorithm and the secret information.
- cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- Difficult to detect, because they often masquerade as utilities, e.g., file compression programs.
- Spoofing
  - Using one computer to masquerade as another, where the latter has privileged access to some third system

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

# basic principles of cryptography

- Messages are put into code (encrypted) by the sender and decoded (decrypted) by the receiver.
- Basic ingredients of conventional cryptography:
  - Plain text input
  - Encryption algorithm
  - Secret key shared by sender and recipient
  - Cipher text (coded input text)
  - Decryption algorithm



#### cryptography example requirements • Suppose input text is • An encryption algorithm is needed. The sender must have this. The receiver must have a THE SKY IS BLUE decryption algorithm, which undoes the encryption algorithm. • Ideally, we would like a strong encryption algorithm, secure against attack. This is usually • Algorithm: Replace each letter by the letter in the alphabet 1 step along. stated as follows: An opponent should be unable to decrypt the ciphertext or discover the key even if s/he is in possession of a number of ciphertexts together with the plain text • Key: 1 which produced them. • Output: • Both sender and receiver must have the secret key(s) for the process to work. This is the UIF TLZ JT CMVF key weakness of symmetric encryption methods. • Note: the security of conventional encryption depends on the secrecy of the key, not • A key of 2 would produce: secrecy of the algorithm. It is usually assumed that it is impractical to decrypt a message VJG UMA KU DNWG on the basis of the ciphertext plus knowledge of the algorithm. We only need to keep the • The process used here is called *substitution* — substituting one element (in this case a key secret. letter) by another. • Another process is *transposition* — Moving parts of the message around, e.g. TLZ UIF JT CMVF cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1 cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

classification of cryptographic systems

- The type of operations used to transform plaintext to ciphertext:
  - substitution
  - transposition
  - Usually some complex combination of these is used.
  - $\mbox{ In any case, no information can be lost in the process.}$
- Whether sender and receiver use the same keys
  - symmetric: sender and receiver use the same keys
  - asymmetric: sender and receiver use different keys
- The number of keys used
- How the plaintext is processed.
  - A block cipher processes the input one block of elements at a time, producing an output block for each input block.
  - A stream cipher processes the input elements continuously, producing one element at a time as it goes along.

# cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

cryptanalysis • the process of attempting to discover the plaintext or the key. • Types of attack: – known plain text attack: \* The opponent has a sample of plaintext and ciphertext, and from this infers the keys; e.g., he may use brute force to try lots of different keys until successful. \* Note that plain text may be compressed and may be numerical in origin, so brute force methods usually require some knowledge of the type of plain text used. \* For a key of length 128 bits, it would take an opponent about  $10^{18}$  years to crack! - chosen plain text attack: \* The opponent gets the computer doing the encryption to encrypt some specially-chosen text (chosen to give clues about the ciphertext); e.g., the blocks may have many blanks or repeated words. - differential cryptanalysis attack: \* The opponent gets the computer doing the encryption to encrypt several blocks of text which differ only slightly; e.g., the opponent then looks at the differences in the ciphertext. cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

<ul> <li>dif</li> </ul>	ferential	fault	ana	lysis
-------------------------	-----------	-------	-----	-------

\* The opponent attacks the hardware of the encryption computer to force it to make mistakes, in order to discover the key or algorithm.

location of encryption devices

- Where should the encryption occur:
  - End-to-end encryption The entire message is encrypted
  - Link encryption Each link along the way is encrypted; not as secure as end-to-end.
- Note, that end-to-end encryption can only encrypt the data portion (contents) of packets and not their headers, since the headers contain destination and sourcing information. Thus, the traffic pattern is not secure.
- Both methods can be used together. One key and method for the end-to-end encryption of data portion of packets. One key and method for the link encryption of the packet header.



#### key distribution

- the most important weakness of symmetric encryption.
- How do computers A and B agree their keys?
- Options:
  - 1. A selects key and delivers it physically to B.
  - 2. A third party C selects the key and delivers it physically to both A and B.
  - 3. If A and B have previously used a key, they could send a new key using an encrypted message.
  - 4. If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third-party C, C could deliver a new key to each of A and B on encrypted links.
- For link encryption, options 1 and 2 may be feasible. But these are not usually feasible for end-to-end encryption.
- Option 3 is vulnerable: If an opponent ever finds a key, all future communications can be read.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### asymmetric (or public) key algorithms

- Similar to symmetric key encryption, but we use at least 2 keys: One for encryption (the public key), and one for decryption (the private key).
- The steps involved are:
  - Keys are generated in pairs, a public key and a private key, by each person or computer (say Bob).
  - The public key is made public (e.g., on a web-site) by Bob.
  - Anyone who wants to send a message to Bob, uses his public key.
  - $\mbox{ Bob decodes the message using his private key.}$
- This approach dates from 1976.
- Public key methods are not necessarily more secure than symmetric algorithms. But there is a larger computational overhead, and this makes brute-force attacks harder to execute successfully.

#### cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

### applications of public key methods

- Encryption sending coded messages.
- Authentication —

when we want to be certain that the sender of a message is actually the person (or computer) they say they are. The sender of the message uses his private key to encrypt the message. Only his public key will be able to decode the message.

• Digital Signature —

The sender "signs" a message using his private key. This application is similar to authentication.

• Key Exchange —

Two parties co-operate to exchange a session key, using the private key of one or both parties.

#### requirements for public key algorithms

- It is computationally easy for party B to generate a pair of keys.
- It is computationally easy for sender A to generate the cipher text on the basis of the plain text and the public key.
- It is computationally easy for party B to decrypt the resulting ciphertext using his private key and so generate the plain text.
- It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to determine the private key from the public key.
- It is computationally infeasible for an opponent to recover the original plain text from the public key and the ciphertext.
- In addition, we may require (not necessary but nice to have): Either of the two related keys may be used for encryption with the other used for decryption.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

### public key algorithms

#### • RSA algorithm

- Developed by Rivest, Shamir & Adleman at MIT in 1977
- RSA is a block cipher in which the plaintext and cipher text are integers between 0 and (n-1) for some n. If M is the plaintext number, and C is the cipher text number, the algorithm works as follows:
  - \* Encryption algorithm:  $C = M^e modulo n$
  - \* Decryption algorithm:  $M = C^d \mod n$
- Both sender and receiver must know the values of n and e. The public key is a pair of numbers (e,n).
- Only the receiver knows the value of d. The private key is the pair of numbers (d, n).
- Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
  - A standard agreed in 1993 for digital signatures in the American National Institute of Standards.
  - Only used for digital signatures (not for encryption or key exchange).

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

#### authentication using asymmetric keys

- Here we use the public and private keys in reverse order to encryption.
- Alice sends a message to Bob
  - Alice encrypts the message using her private key, which only she knows.
  - Bob receives the cipher text, and decrypts it using Alice's public key.
  - $-\ensuremath{\,\text{lf}}$  Alice really did send the message, the output should be plain text.
  - If someone else (say, Mary) sent the message, then Alice's public key will not work on this message.
- So, this provides a way to authenticate a message, assuming the private key has not been stolen or somehow made public.
- Note that this method does not keep the message secret. Anyone can use Alice's public key (since it is public!) to decode Alice's message.
- $\bullet$  This approach is also used for Digital Signatures, analogous to personal signatures on checks.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

# public key distribution of symmetric keys

- How do 2 parties share a symmetric key? These are also called secret keys, to distinguish them from public and private keys.
- They could deliver them physically (e.g., by courier).
- If they already share a secret key, they could send the new one by encrypted message.
- They could use public key certificates, as follows:
  - 1. Bob sends Alice his public key using a public key certificate.
  - 2. Alice prepares a message.
  - 3. Alice encrypts the message using one-off symmetric key for this session, e.g., she uses a session key.
  - 4. Alice encrypts the session key using Bob's public key.
  - 5. Alice attaches the encrypted session key to the message and sends it to Bob.

Only Bob is able to decrypt the session key (since only he has his private key). So, only Bob can read the original message.

# how to distribute public keys?

- Answer is simple: put on your web-site, email your friends, shout it from the roof-tops!
- But if Alice gets an email from Bob telling her that 1023 is his public key, how does she know it really is his? Maybe someone is impersonating him and sending out a false key in his name!
- Digital Certificates seek to get around this. A user (e.g., Bob) presents his public key to a trusted third party and receives a digital certificate. The certificate contains a public key together with a a user ID for the key owner (Bob), all signed by the third party.
- Examples of third parties: Government agencies or a bank. The user (Bob) can then give the digital certificate to anyone else (e.g., Alice).
- A standard for digital certificates is X.509.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

### cryptographic systems (1)

Cryptography is used in several systems serving a variety of purposes

- Message Digest Functions
  - These produce a summary digest of a file, and can be used to see if the file has been altered.
  - Useful for detecting presence of viruses or tampering by opponents.
  - Sometimes used for message authentication codes (appended to a message, so that the receiver can see if the message was altered during transit).
  - Examples: HMAC, MD series (128 bit digest), SHA series (160 bit digest).
- Digital signatures
  - $-\ensuremath{\,\text{Unique}}$  identifier of a sender of a message
  - Can use public key cryptography in reverse
- Digital Certificates
  - Issued by trusted third party (e.g. bank, government agency) to verify user is who they say they are.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- Usually third party's signature encrypted by the private key of the authorization party
   \* So the receiver (Bob) needs to decode the authorization signature using the public key of the third party.
  - \* Then, if this works, use the public key of the sender (Alice) to decode her signature.

#### some approaches to security

Logging tools

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- software tools which monitor use of a computer
- $-\log$  particular events, e.g., user logins, transferring web-pages, attempts to access secure files
- check for unusual events, e.g., access at unusual times, a user logging in and out repeatedly (could be seeking to gather info), a user mistyping a password (could be an attempted hack), a user accessing strange web-sites (e.g. military sites)
- Virus scanners software which looks for unusual changes to files (especially operating system files)
- Security Checking software used by system administrators to identify potential problems, e.g., scanners, password cracking software
- Network topology techniques
  - Design the topology of the network so as to make intrusion difficult
  - A common technique is a *firewall*
- cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

# cryptographic systems (2)

#### • PGP

- "Pretty Good Privacy"
- A publicly-available system for encrypting files and email messages
- $-\operatorname{\mathsf{PGP}}$  uses:
  - $\ast$  RSA for management of keys in symmetric encryption
  - $\ast$  IDEA algorithm for sending data using symmetric encryption
  - $\ast$  MD5 scheme for ensuring no tampering.
- Main weakness: if a public key is compromised, than a revocation certificate has to be issued to everyone in contact with the person whose keys are compromised.
- PCT Microsoft product similar to SSL (Secure Sockets Layer, to be discussed later)
- SHTTP A secure version of HTTP. Did not take off.
- SET (Secure Electronic Transactions) for credit card info (more later)

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

- This is an extra element placed between a network (or a network element) and the external world.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1



firealls:	what	protection	do	they	offer?

- Any attacker can only reach the proxy server e.g., deleting web-pages from the proxy just deletes them from the cache, not from the real web server.
- A stronger form of protection is a screened subnet. This has 2 layers of protection, with routers on each side.
- In the central zone, between the two routers, are proxy servers for various functions:
  - A proxy web-server
  - A proxy email server
  - etc.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

Each contacts a real server in the internal network

firewalls: types	
Packet-filtering router	
<ul> <li>Applies rules to each incoming packet and forwards or rejects them, one by</li> <li>Filters may be on source or destination address fields.</li> </ul>	one.
Application-level gateway	
<ul> <li>Clients attempt to use a specific TCP/IP application, such as Telnet or FT</li> </ul>	P.
<ul> <li>To gain access past the firewall, they must enter access details (e.g., userna password).</li> </ul>	ame and
- If details are correct, the application is allowed to proceed; otherwise, not.	
Circuit-level gateway	
<ul> <li>This firewall does not permit an end-to-end TCP connection.</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>The firewall sets up two TCP connections:</li> </ul>	
* One between it and the external client.	
* One between it and the internal client.	
<ul> <li>Messages are relayed across from one connection to the other.</li> </ul>	

- Normally, message are not examined - the security occurs in setting up the connections. • Typically, a bastion host is the platform for an application-level or a circuit-level gateway. cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1

# Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

- SSL was developed by Netscape for Netscape Navigator (its browser)
- It operates at the levels between: (1) HTTP and FTP and (2) TCP/IP
- Main functions of SSL:
  - SSL server authentication
    - \* Enables a client to confirm the identity of a server.
  - \* Uses public key cryptography to validate the digital certificate of a server and confirm that it has been issued by a valid certification authority.
  - SSL client authentication
    - \* Enables a server to confirm the identity of a client
  - SSL encryption
    - \* Uses symmetric encryption to send data to/from servers/clients.
- There are 2 sub-protocols
  - SSL Record Protocol used for transmission of bulk data
  - SSL Handshake Protocol used to establish the keys and algorithms to be used for data transfer



firewalls: limitations
Firewalls cannot protect against everything!!
• e.g., disgruntled employees on the inside network
• e.g., attacks which bypass the firewall
<ul> <li>– e.g., internal systems may have a dial-out facility to connect to an ISP.</li> <li>– e.g., a modem to allow travelling employees to dial-in to the internal network remotely.</li> </ul>
• Firewalls cannot screen every type of email or request
<ul> <li>Viruses and malicious code may still get past a firewall, particularly if they are not presented in the usual form (e.g. email attachments).</li> </ul>
20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1 50

# The SSL process

- Phase 1: Handshake
  - To authenticate server
  - To authenticate client (optional)
  - To agree secret keys and algorithms for part 2.
- Phase 2: Data transfer.
- SSL uses public key cryptography for the handshake, i.e.,
  - $-\ensuremath{\,\text{To}}$  authenticate client and server
  - To establish keys and algorithms for encryption of data transfer.
- SSL uses symmetric key cryptography for encryption and decryption of data in the data transfer.

cis20.1-fall2007-sklar-lecIII.1